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The Hippocratic Oath
I swear by Apollo Ph ysician and Asclepius anq H ygeia a nd P a nacea and
all the gods and goddesses, making them m y witnesses , that I will fulfill
according to my ability and judgment t his oath a nd this cove nant:
. To hold him who has taught me this art as eq ual to m y parents and to
h~e my life in partners hip with him , and if h e is in need of mon ey to givf>
hJm a share of min e,. and to regard his offspring as eq ual to m y brothers in
male lineage and to teach them this art- if they desire to learn it - without
fee and covenant; to give a share of prece pts and oral instruction a nd all the
other learning to m y sons and to th e so ns of him who has instructed me and
to pupils who have signed the covenant and ha ve ta k e n an oath according to
the m edical law , but to no one else .
.I. will apply di etetic m eas ures for t he benefit of the sic k according to my
ab1hty and judgment; I will keep them fro m harm and injustice.
I will neith er give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it , nor will I
make a suggestion to this effect. Similarly I will not give to a woman a n
abortive rem edy . In purity and holiness I will guard m y life and my art.
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I will not use the knife, not even on sufferers from stone, but will
withdraw in favor of such men as are engaged in this work .
Whatever house I may visit, I will come for the benefit of the sick ,
remaining free of all intentional injustice, of all mischief and in particular o f
sexual relations with both female and male persons, be they free or slaves.
Whatever I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside
of the treatment'in regard to the life of men, which on no account one must
spread abroad, I will keep to myself holding such things shameful to be
spoken about.
If I fulfill this oath and do not violate it, may it be granted to me to enjoy
life and art, being honored with fame among all men for all time to come ; if
I transgress it and swear falsely, may the opposite of all this be my lot. 1

The Oath According to Hippocrates
In So Far as a Christian May Swear It
Blessed be God the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, Who is blessed fo r
ever and ever; I lie not.
I will bring no stain upon the learning of the medical art. Neither will I
give poison to anybody though asked to do so, nor will I suggest such a
plan. Similarly I will not give treatment to women to cause abortion, treat
ment neither from above nor from below . But I will teach thilil art, to thosP
who require to learn it, without grudging and without an indenture. I wi ll
use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and judgment. And ir
purity and in holiness I will guard my art. Info whatsoever houses I enter, 1
will do so to help the sick , keepirig free from all wrongdoing, intentional o r
unintentional, tending to death or to injury, and from fornication with
bond or free, man or woman. Whats.oever in the course of practice I see or
hear (or outside my practice in social intercourse) that ought not to be
published abroad, I will not divulge, but consider such things to be holy
secrets. Now if I keep this oath and break it not, may God be my helper in
my life and art, and may I be honoured among all men for all time. If I keep
faith , well; but if I forswear myself may the opposite befall me. 2

The Hippocratic Oath is the most familiar of that long line of oat hs,
prayers, and codes by which doctors have transmitted an ethos to
members of their profession. Indeed, it is sometimes simply called
"the doctor's oath." In our age, however, enamored of novelty and
confident of its technological powers, familiarity seems to have bred,
if not contempt, 3 at least the sort of quaint regard which relegates
ancient documents to the historian's museum of curiosities. It is my
intention, nevertheless, to suggest that there are lessons to be learned
- or relearned - from this oath and its history, lessons which can be
instructive concerning a professional ethic for physicians and the possible contributions of theology to that ethic.
The intention ought not be misunderstood. I will not suggest that
the Hippocratic Oath is an adequate and comprehensive foundat ion
for a professional ethic today. I will not call upon doctors and moralists concerned with medical ethics to swear it again. I will not deny
that the invocation of Apollo, Asclepius, Hygeia, Panacea, and all the
gods and godd~sses sounds quaint to modern ears or claim that such
an invocation can be made with Christian integrity. I will not denY
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that the ~ncient ins~i~utions presupposed in the oath for the learning
and prac~Ice of medicme differ from their contemporary counterparts.
~nd Will not recommend the stipulations of the oath as a code to
Simpl_Ify the address to the dilemmas and quandaries posed by medical
practice.

!

That list of disclaimers, it may easily be observed, involves every
part of the oath. It may prompt the question of what is to be salvaged.
But the lessons to be gleCJ.ned from this ancient do cument are not to
be f?und in its content so much as in certain features of its history
and Its method. I want to suggest that there are lessons to be learned
(1) from its reformist intention; (2) from its treatment of medicine as
a practice with intrinsic goods and standards; and ( 3) from setting
these standards in a context which expressed and evoked an identity
and recognized one 's dependence upon and indebtedness to a communit~ and to the transcendent. Finally, I want to suggest (4) that
t?ere IS a lesson for Christians who would contribute to the discusSIOns of bioethics in the early Church's adoption and revision of the
doctor's oath. In an age when medicine's powers flourish, but its ethos
flou?ders, the ancient oath may help us to attend to ways of doing
mediCal ethics which are not currently popular. I undertake, therefore
both to describe certain features of the ancient oath and to defend
the~ as having some promise for the contemporary consideration of
~ed1eal ethics in comparison to certain features of the current
hterature.
~ccording to Ludwig Edelstein, interpreter of the oath, t he Hippocratic Oath was not formulated by the great Hippocrates himself but
·by a small group of Pythagorean physicians late in the fourth cen'tury
B.C. Edelstein observes that the oath was a minority opinion, "a
Pythagorean manifesto," writt en against the stream and intending
the reform of medicine 4
~or centuries before the oath, ancient physicians had provided
P_oison for those whom they could not heal, had counted abortifaCients among the tools of their trade, and had been disposed to the use
of the knife instead of the less invasive use of dietetics and pharmac~logy. Moreover, they had sometimes been guilty of injustice and
nuschief toward their patients, and sometimes quite shamelessly
broken confidences . ·
. When the little sect of Pythagoreans set out to reform the condi~~~n of ~e?icine, they ~ound no help in the law , which forbade
either _smc1de nor abortiOn. They could plainly find no help in the
conventiOnal behavior of physicians in antiquity. Nor did they find
help in any " philosophical consensus ," for , insofar as there was any
~eement about these issues, it worked against the Pythagorean position . Platonists , Cynics, and Stoics could honor suicide as a courageous triumph over fate. Aristotelians and Epicureans were much
lllore circumspect, but they did not forbid suicide. And abortion was
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typically considered essential for a well-ordered state. The argume1 s
between Pythagoreans and other Greek philosophers must ha e
seemed as interminable and as conceptually incommensurable as a y
contemporary moral argument. The minority status of their opinio . s,
however, did not dissuade the Pythagoreans.
The point is not to defend the oath's absolute prohibitions of a b ·rtion and euthanasia and surely not to defend Pythagorean philosoJ ty ·
or the premises it might supply to defend such prohibitions. 5 r; 1e
point is rather to call attention to this feature of the oath 's met! >d
and history, that in spite of their minority position, the conviction ~ of
this community led them and moved them to reform. They refuse( to
be satisfied with the medicine they saw around them. They refuse( to
reduce medical morality to what the law allowed or what some p h losophical consensus determined. They intended the reform of medi c 1e.
Investigate, Articulate an Ethic

"public" goo~, for then it threatens to restrict and subvert autonomy.
S_uch recent literature on medical ethics has provided - and can proVIde - o?l~ a "thin theory of the good," 7 only a shriveled and dangerously mimmal construal of the moral life in its medical dimensions.
We find,_in_ much contemporary medical ethics, for example, a readiness to Insist on procedures to protect autonomy but a reticence to
provide . an~ advice ab?ut the morally proper uses of that autonomy
and a dismissal of the Idea that physicians should be the ones to give
such advice.
·
·
The Hippocratic Oath, however, can remind us that the current
focus on autonomy and contracts and procedural questions provides
only a minimal account of medical morality. It can encourage us to
own a fuller vision of medical morality and to seek the reform of
medicine in the light of that vision .
The Pythagoreans' reform movement finally triumphed. The oath
~adu~lly moved from the status of a counter-cultural manifesto to a
histone do_c ument which formed and informed the ethos of physicians
for ~entun_es . The explanation for this trimph was not any philosophiCal tn~mph by the Pythagoreans; their influence, never great,
Wane~i. Their reform, however, articulated not just Pythagorean moral
~remises and conclusions, but standards inherent in medicine when it
Is seen as a practice with certain intrinsic goods . They situated these
stand~ds in a context which provided and formed identity and which
recognized dependence and indebtedness to a community and to the
t~nsc~ndent. These standards finally won the support of another
mmonty community, a community which did move to dominance in
·Western culture - the Christian Church. These features of the oath
ex_plai~ its triumph. They are still instructive and, after more than two
rnill~ma, again innovative. They can help form the " fuller vision " of
medical morality which may once again call for and sustain the reform
of medicine .
·

The lesson, I suggest, for the contemporary discussions of me cal
ethics is that some, at least, should take courage to investigate nd
articulate a medical ethic which may stand at some remove f ') ffi
conventional behavior and attitudes within the profession and w i ich
may be based on convictions and standards more particular and •refound than legal and contractual obligations or some. minimal pi ilosophical consensus. Communities with convictions about what hu r an
persons are meant to be and to become, with visions of what it m . ·ans
for embodied persons to flourish and thrive, have an opportunity and
vocation to think through the art of medicine from their own perspectives.
The recent literature on medical ethics has not owned such an
agenda. Indeed, the moral convictions and visions of particular communities typically have been tolerated and trivialized in the litera t ure.
On the one hand, there is an insistence that everyone 's moral poin t of 1
The Pythagoreans began with their own convictions about human
view should be respected. On the other hand, there has been an insisflourishing. But one of these convictions concerned the moral signifitence that the only arguments which may count publicly are th ose
cance of the crafts, the arts, the tekne. s The Pythagoreans honored
which can be made independently of a distinctive moral point of vi ew. .
the arts, especially music and medicine, as having moral and indeed
This simultaneous tolerance and trivialization is accomplished by
ontological significance. Therefore, they did not simply appl; Pythag~
making the autonomy of the agent the highest human good, by makorean premises t.o morally neutral medical skills; instead, they tried to
ing contracts between such autonomous agents the model of hu man
educe and elucidate the moral significance of the craft the art the
relationships, and by focusing almost exclusively on the proced ural
tekne of medi cine itself. Because this Pythagorean attitude to' the
question of who should decide. G The ancient enterprise of attem pting
Craf~s came to be dominant in late philosophical schools, notably the
to understand and communicate the intrinsic good of human persons
Stoics, 9 the Pythagorean reform of medicine flourished while
Py
,
·
thagorean philosophy waned.
and of some human relationships and activities has been largely a bandoned. Attempts to articulate communities' or traditions' address to
In striking an intriguing contrast to most contemporary literature
those ancient questions may be tolerated if the " good" is kept to
~~ medical ethics, which so often picks an ethical theory (whether
themselves, relegated resolutely to a " private " arena and, thus, trivialbIll's o~ Rawls 's _o~ Nozick 's or . .. ) and applies to to dilemmas faced
ized. It may not even be tolerated if the "good" is announ ced as
Y medical practitiOners, the Pythagorean conviction about the crafts
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allowed and required one to identify the good implicit in the craft ; ,d
to articulate the standards coherent with the good of the cr 't.
According to the oath, then, the doctor is obligated not because h is
a Pythagorean, but because he is a doctor, and his obligations co n st
not only of standards based on Pythagorean doctrine but also of s1 ndards implicit in medicine.
The oath treats medicine as a craft, an art, a tekne, or t o se ·
Alasdair Macintyre 's term, 10 as a practice, not simply as a se1 of
technical skills. That is to say, it treats medicine as a form of h lll an
activity with goods internal to it and standards of excellence im p cit
in it, not simply as an assortment of skills which can be made to s( ·ve
extrinsic goods with merely technological excellence.
Oath Identifies Medicine's Goal
The goal of medicine, the good which is intrinsic to the practi• ~ . is
identified by the oath as " the benefit of the sick ." To benefit th e ;ick •
is not simply the motive for taking up certain ethically neutral ~- <ills
nor merely an extrinsic end to be accomplished by ethically ne tral '
technical means . 11 It is, rather, the goal of medicine as a practice . and
so it governed the physician 's use of his skills in diet, drugs, and
surgery, and the use of his privileged access to the patient's hom ( a nd
privacy. This intrinsic good entailed standards of professional e ~ cel
lence which could not be reduced to technological excellence
The pattern is repeated again and again in the oath. Its prohibi; ions
of active euthanasia, of assisting in suicide, and of abortio n , for
example, were not argued on the basis of Pythagorean premises; t ?ey ,
were given as standards of a practice whose goal is to benefit th e s1ck.
Because the ends intrinsic to medicine are to heal the sick, to p ro tect
and nurture health , to maintain and restore physical well-being, li m its ,
could be imposed on the use of skills within the practice. The skills
were not to be used to serve alien ends, and the destru cti on of I
human life - either the last of it or the first of it - was seen as an
alien and conflicting end. The point was not that one would fail t o be
a good Pythagorean if one violated these standards, although t h at is .
true enough, but rather that one would fail to be a good m ed ical
practitioner . The good physician is not a mere technician ; he is committed by the practice of medicine to certain goods and to ce rtain 1
standards.
The notoriously difficult foreswearing of surgery, even on t hose
who stand to benefit from it, is also founded on the notion of medicine as a practice. Edelstein is probably right in tracing this stipu lat ion
to the Pythagorean preference for dietetics and pharmacology as
modes of treatment,l2 but the foreswearing in the oath did no t appeal
to any uncompromising Pythagorean position about either the appetitive and dietetic causes of illness or the defilement of shedding blo od.
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U rather articulated a standard for medical practice whose goal is to
benefit the sick: namely, don 't attempt what lies beyond your competence. To benefit the sick was not merely a motive, but the good
intrinsic to medicine, and to put the patient at risk needlessly- even
with the best of intentions- can be seen to violate medicine understood as such a practice. There was, therefore, no universal prohibition
of surgery, only the particular prohibition of surgery by those illequipped to attempt it. That standard may well have been of particular relevance to Pythagorean physicians, but one need not have been a
Pythagorean to accept its wisdom as a standard of practice.
The stipulations concerning decorum are yet another example.
They can be readily understood against the background of Pythagorean asceticism and the proverbial " Pythagorean silence " 13 but
again, the oath presented them not as Pythagorean stipulatio~s, but a~
s~andards of medicine understood as a practice. The goal of the practice, "the benefit of the sick, " was repeated in this context even as the
(necessary) intrusion into the privacy, the homes, of the sick was
acknowledged. The physician 's access to the intimacies of the patient's
body and household and his exposure to the vulnerability of the
patient and his household were granted and accepted for the sake of
the goal intrinsic to medicine. To use such access for any other end or
to make public the vulnerability to which the physician was made
privy was seen to subvert the relation of such access and such exposure to the end of medicine. It debased the patient who should be
benefitted. It vitiated medicine as a practice and, therefore, the standards prohibiting sexual relations with patients and prohibiting
breaches of confidentiality were implicit in medicine as a practice.
These standards could be further explicated 14 and if the point of
t?is essay were to treat the oath as a cod~ , th~n the further explicatiOn would be necessary. But that is not the point. It is not my claim
that the oath provides an unexceptionable code of conduct. The standards of a practice at any particular time are not immune from criticism. The point is to call attention to this feature of the oath 's method
that it construes medicine as a practice. It does not provide a timeles~
code for medicine, but there are standards of excellence appropriate
to and partly definitive of the practice, whose authority must be
acknowledged, and there is a good intrinsic to the practice which must
be appreciated and allowed to govern the skills and to form and
~form the standards. The lesson, I suggest, for the contemporary
discussions of medical ethics, is that those who seek the constant
~eform of medicine should also construe medicine as a practice with
· lln.plicit goods and standards.
That is a hard but important lesson in a culture as bullish on technology and as pluralistic in values as our own. There is a constant
tendency to reduce medicine to a mere - but awesome - collection of
techniques that may be made to serve extrinsic goods, t hemselves
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often reduced to matters of taste.
The technology of abortion is a telling example. In Roe u. Wa c ~.
the Court declared that a woman 's decision with respect to abort i n
was a private matter between herself and her physician. It recogni'i d
that the moral status of the fetus was controverted, but it held tl 1t
the fetus is not a legal person and so is not .entitled to the protecti n
the law extends to persons. It wanted to leave the moral controve Y
about the status of the fetus within that private arena of the decisio a
woman and her doctor would make. The court presumed (and s ggested by calling the decision to abort a "medical decision") that ' te
professional ethos of physicians would limit abortions, even if_abort: n
were legalized, and it might have been, if there had been a v1v1d se se
of medicine as a practice . 15 The legal license was interpreted by m r 1y
(both women and physicians) as a moral license and the outcome as
been a callous and frightening disregard for fetal life and welfare. 'l 1e
protests - usually applying some extrinsic good or extrinsic stand rd
- have been long and loud and have sometimes exhibited call• us
disregard for the rights of women with respect to their own bodies t 1d
ignored the legitimate controversy about the status of the fetus. ', he
opportunity for medicine to reassert itself as a practice, different fr· . m
the practice of politics of the marketplace, has almost been lost . J ut
the lesson of the oath is that the attempt is both possible and wo1 ,hwhile.
The notion of medicine as a practice stands in marked contrast t .J a
good deal of the current literature concerning the professions in g,m eral and medicine in particular. Michael Bayles, for example, won ld
reject the normative characteristics of the professions, incl~d mg
medicine.lG He reduces the professions to skills learned by tram mg
and made accessible to consumers. The professions, on this view , are
not justified or guided by any intrins1c good but by "the values of a
liberal society."17 Thus, there are no standards implicit in the pract 1ce
but only "ordinary norms" to be applied in professional contexts.. .
The problems with such a view are manifold. One is lingU1st1c.
"Professional" and "unprofessional" continue to be used evaluat1vely
and, moreover, with respect to excellences not merely technical. .
The notion of applying ordinary norms to medical dilemmas 1s also
problematic. It is naive and presumptuous to suppose th~t a moral
philosopher or theologian can boldly put to flight a moral dilemma by
expertly wielding a sharp principle or some heavy theory. 18 And how
shall we select the " ordinary norms" to apply? Justice is surely relevant, but there is more than one theory of justice. Good ends surely
ought to be sought in medicine, too, but shall we use St. Thomas
Aquinas or John Stuart Mill to define a good end? The values of
society may be important, but none of us, I trust, has forgotten the
atrocities committed when Hitler's vision of a "third reich" was
applied to medicine.
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'I am much more comfortable with Bayles's "values of a liberal
society" than with Hitler's "third reich," but I am not so much more
confident about the practice of politics than the practice of medicine
that I would make the professional ethic dependent upon our political
ethic. Indeed, I wonder whether a society is truly "liberal" if it tailors
the professions to a liberal society's (minimal) vision of the good. A
liberal society can be guilty of trivializing ancient wisdom about
human flourishing when it.renders the professions, including medicine,
merely instrumental skills to satisfy consumer wants.
Application of 'Ordinary Norms'
Bayles's application of his "ordinary norms" to medicine leads to
minimal moral claims and, because the minimal character of the claims
is not acknowledged, to a truncated and distorted medical ethic. There
is, for example, no limit to " professional services" when a profession
is basically skills accessible to consumers: laetrile, genetic testing for
sex determination, plastic surgery to win the Dolly Parton look-alike
contest, all become the sphere of the professional-entrepreneur.
Immoral clients cannot be refused on the basis of " professional
integrity," for there is no such thing. Bayles is aware of the problem
posed by clients who would use professional skills for ends which are
morally questionable but which do not clearly violate the " ordinary
norms," and he presents two options for dealing with such clients. The
"no difference " option quite candidly leaves no room for integrity of
any kind and renders the professional the "animated tool " of the
· consumer. l 9 The . second option perm its the physician to refuse
services to such clients on the basis of "moral integrity," but this
"moral integrity " is represented as strictly personal and private rather
than professional. 2 o
Bayles's attempt to reduce professional norms to " ordinary norms"
applied in a medical context, to give one more exampie, leads to a
minimal and truncated version of the prohibition of sexual intercourse
With patients . 2 1 The ordinary norm he provides, that sexual intercourse requires the free consent of both parties, is itself a dangerously
minimal account of sexual ethics. It does provide a justification for
~he prohibition, · but it does not discount either the possibility or the
Importance of a " proft=;ssional " justification , that the (necessary)
access to the patient's privacy and vulnerability must be guided by and
limited to the "good" of medicine and not be used for extrinsic ends
. (even when they are freely chosen or consented to).
The debate about the crafts, about the professions, is an ancient
and an enduring one. The lesson of the oath is that we should not too
readily accept the notion of medicine as a collection of skills accessible to consumers. We should not identify our task as simply applying
Universal and rational norms of conduct to medicine and to the quan-
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daries faced within it. 2 2
If the tekne of medicine is construed simply in terms of its tee 1niques or skills, learned by training and accessible to consumers, thr 1,
of course, it is morally neutral. Skill in pharmacology enables one o
be a good healer or a crafty murderer. But if a tekne is more tf .n
technique, if it has its own goal and its own virtues, then it is han '.{
morally neutral. Then some moral wisdom about living as a fi te
body may exist within the practice of medicine and within th c >e
communities and traditions which learn and teach medicine as apr ctice. Then medicine's fragile capacity to resist being co-apted by tn
alien ideology, even a liberal ideology (not to mention the " t h cd
reich"), can be strengthened and nurtured. The lesson of the oat! I
suggest, is that for some, at least, the task should be to defend · 1e
vision of medicine as a practice while educing and elucidating 'le
goods and standards implicit in that practice.
The Hippocratic Oath had its origins among the Pythagoreans "' .1o
had the courage to attempt the reform of medicine and the wisd m
not merely to apply Pythagorean premises to medicine but to canst ue
it as a practice. It was handed down not as legislation but as a va l mtary rule imposing voluntary obedience. Its power to reform was ot
coercive or simply rationally persuasive; its power to reform wa tts
power to form character and a community which nurtured it. It lid
not set its standards in a context of legal sanctions o:r in a contex t of
impartial rationality . It set these standards in a context w h tch
expressed and evoked an identity and recognized one's depend ence
upon and indebtedness to both a community and the transcendent. To
those features of the oath we turn next.
The oath, like all oaths and promises, was a performative declar~
tion rather than a descriptive one . It did not just describe reality ; Jt
altered it. The one who swore this · oath was never the same " o ne"
again. The one swearing this oath adopted more than a set of rules and
skills; he or she adopted an identity. The goods and standards of
medicine as a practice were owned as one's own and gave shape to
integrity with one's identity. Therefore, "physician" was a descript iOn
not only of what one knew or of what one did or of what one k new
how to do, but of who one was. Henceforth, one examined questio ns
of conduct in this role not as an impartial and rational agent, calculating utility sums, say, but as a physician. Integrity with this i?e ntiy
called for the physician to exert himself on behalf of the pat1ent at
hand, even the patient-scoundrel at hand, without calculating t he
greatest good for the greatest number. Indeed, to allow that quest iOn ,
to bear toward the patient the kind of impartial relation which m akes
it plausible, was to lose one's identity, to forfeit one's integr~ty: .
This featur~ of the oath calls our attention to the moral s1gmf1ca nce
of "identity ." Once again the Jesson of the doctor's oath sets a different agenda than the one contemporary medical ethics has generally

undertaken. Contemporary medical ethics usually adopts the perspective of impartial rationality, either in the form of utilitarianism or in
the form of contract theory. 23 To adopt any such impartial perspective, however, requires the doctor's alienation from his own moral
interests and loyalties qua physician, from himself and from his special
relationship to his patient. Doctors are asked, indeed, obliged, by this
perspective to view the project and passion of their practice as though
they were outside objective observers.
They are asked by this approach to disown- and for the sake of
morality - the goods and standards they possess as their own and
which give them their moral character as physicians. 24
Impartial Rationality Perspective
The perspective of impartial rationality is not to be disowned. It
can enable conversation between people with different loyalties and
the adjudication of conflicting interests, and it can challenge the arbitrary dominance of one perspective over another. To be made to pause
occasionally and, for the sake of analysis and judgment, to view things as
impartially as we can is not only legitimate, but also salutary. But such
an ethic remains minimal at best, and if its minimalism is not acknowledged, it can distort the moral life. Physicians - and patients ·cannot consistently live their moral lives like that with any integrity.
The Hippocratic Oath calls our attention to the importance of a physician's identity, character, and integrity. Such an approach might
recover the importance of performative rituals like swearing an initiatory oath, and it would surely attend not only to the ways in which
acts effectively realize ends, but also to the ways in which acts express
values and form character. 25
The oath expressed and evoked an identity, but it was an identity
Which recognized its dependence upon and indebtedness to a community and the transcendent.
The oath bound one to a community where not only the requisite
skills were taught, but where the requisite character and identity were
nurtured. The doctor swore to live in fellowship (Gk.: koinosasthai)
with his teacher, to share a common life with him. He pledged, moreover, to teach the art to his teacher's sons, to his own sons, and to all
who wanted to le~n not simply the skills, but also the practice. Here
Was not an autonomous individual practitioner, utilizing his skills for
his private good or according to his private vision of the good or as
contracted by another to accomplish the other's "good ." The doctor
Who swore the oath stood self-consciously in a community and in a
tradition. He acknowledged gratefully his dependence upon this comrnunity and tradition, his indebtedness to his teacher, and his responsibility to protect and nurture the practice of medicine. 26
This section of the oath is often criticized. 27 It is accused of fostering
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a medical guild where obligations to colleagues take priority 0 ' r
obligations to patients. so that medical incompetence and malpracl e
are usually covered up and the incompetent and unscrupulous (p J tected by the guild) do further harm to patients . The charge i a
serious one, and the profession's reluctance to discipline its m~m b rs
make it cogent. The fault is not with the oath, however, but with ' te
corruption of the oath in the absence of a commitment to medicin! as
a practice. When there is such a commitment, it governs relations Vv th
colleagues as well as patients, and protecting and nurturing the p1 .ctice - both the requisite skills and the requisite character - ena <le
and require communal discipline. The failure of the professio n t o
discipline itself adequately may be traced not to the perspective o f he
oath but to the dismissal of the perspective of the oath.
Today the training for .medicine has shifted to university-ba ed
medical schools, which pride themselves on their scientific detachrr- ·nt
from questions of value in their dispassionate pursuit of the t n th.
Such a context can virtually sponsor the construal of medicine ; s a
collection of skills and techniques to be used for extrinsic goods w l .ch
are not matters of truth but matters of taste . 28 Then there is no
community of people committed to a practice and under its standa ds ;
there is only the camaraderie of those who have undergon e th e s. me
arduous routine. Then the profession lacks both a commitment . o a
practice which makes discipline possible and a genuine enough c >mmunity to make discipline a nurturing as well as a punishing activity.
The stress on community in the oath can help call our attentio •1 to
the moral necessity of attending to the institutions, communities, and
traditions within which the physician 's identity is nurtured . Ad d ing
courses in medical ethics taught by philosophers or theologians t o the
curricula of medical schools may be important, but it is neither essential nor sufficient. Indeed, if such courses are co-opted as token evidence of the moral concern of the institution, or if clinical instructors
abdicate the responsibility for difficult decisions to "the m oral
expert," the results could be counter-productive. It is more important
to have teachers chosen and rewarded not only for their excellent
skills but also for their excellence in medical practice - chosen and
rewarded not only for their ability to teach the skills, but also for the
ability to model the practice. The philosopher or theologian may then
have an important role as participant in- and midwife for- a continuing dialogue between such teachers and their students abou t the
goods and standards implicit in medicine as a practice. In su ch a
continuing dialogue there will surely be continuing conflicts, but so
any living tradition is passed down.
No less important than institutions where doctors are train ed a~e
institutions within which they practice and the communities withtn
which they live, including the religious communities. That religious
communities might nurture and sustain the identity of physicians JS,
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af course, suggested by the doctor's oath itself. The physician
acknowledged his dependence upon and indebtedness to not only the
community of doctors, but also to the transcendent.
The opening line called all the gods and goddesses as witnesses to
this oath, and the last line puts the doctor at the mercy of divine
justice. The invocation of the gods and their divine retribution served
of course, to signify the solemnity of the oath and the stringency of
the obligations. More than that, however, was accomplished by the
oath's piety, by its recognition of our 'dependence upon and indebtedness to transcendent power which bears down on us and sustains us. A
narrative is provided, a narrative which helps inform identity and helps
sustain community, a narrative which supports and tests the practice
of medicine. The deities named are a lineage. Apollo, the god of truth
and light, here invoked as "Apollo Physician," is the father of
~sclepius. Asclepius, the father of medicine and the patron of physiCians and patients, had two daughters, Hygeia and Panacea, or
"Health" and "All-heal," the goddesses of health maintenance and
therapy. 29 It is a story of the divine origins and transmission of the
work physicians are given and gifted to do. To undertake the work of
a physician was to make this story one 's own story, to continue it and
embody it among human beings. They were not tempted to "play
God" or to deny their subordinate role, but they were supported and
encouraged in their ministrations by this story. In serving patients in
their practice, they continued a narrative that had its beginnings
among the gods. They were not tempted to magic by this story,3o but
they were enabled to acknowledge the mystery of healing, the subtle
and profound connections of the spirit and the body. 31
Reminder of Religious Dimensions
This feature of the oath can remind us of the religious dimensions
of medicine and medical morality . It is a hard but important lesson for
an age as noisily secular as ours. The oath, I think, is an example of
the ·moral significance of a natural piety , the importance of what
Calvin would call a sensus divinitatis, the sense of the divine. This
natural piety includes the sense of gratitude for the gifts of life and of
the world, a sense of dependence upon some reliable, bu t dimly
known order, a sense of some tragic fault in the midst of our world,
and a sense of responsibility to the inscrutable power Who stands
behind the gifts and the order and Who judges the fault. 32 One can do
· Worse, I think, than name this other wrongly ; one could understand
(misunderstand) this other as the " enemy" of his own work, as a
deluding power, or one could deny or (like so much of the contemPorary literature) ignore this other and these senses. The oath adopted
neither of those forms of distrust; 33 rather, it set the practicE~ of
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medicine in the context of a natural piety, i.n the context of a sense ·
gratitude, of dependence, of tragedy, and of responsibility to the tra
scendent. Such a natural piety can still nourish and sustain the phy
cian's calling. Its responsiveness to the transcendent can protect t l
physician both from the presumption of " playing God" and from t l
reductionism of plying the trade for hire. It remains part of the ful l r
vision of medicine.
The triumph of the doctor 's oath may finally be attributed to t .
triumph of a new religion in the ancient world. Christianity adopted
as its own, finally presenting it in a Christian form , " The O a h
According to Hippocrates In So Far As A Christian May Swear H ''
There were certain revisions, to be sure, but the continuity of t e
Christian version with the ancient oath is undeniable . Both the cc 1tinuity and the revisions are instructive for Christian theologians a . d
communities who take part in the current discussions of bioethics.
First note the adoption and reiteration of the standards of 1e
Hippoc~atic Oath. There are some minor variations in the stipulatil ns
governing the practice- the operation clause is omitt_e~' . e\ 2n
"unintentional" harm (negligence) is forbidden, the prohibitio n of
abortion is amplified -but the similarity is the striking thing. '1 he
claim is not that here finally we have a Christian code to be used < d
applied to current dilemmas. The claim is rather that there is a l es~ n
here for those Christians who would contribute to the conversat w ns
about medical ethics. The lesson is that Christian ethics does n ot
disown " natural" morality. It does not construct an ethic ex nih lo,
out of nothing. It selects and assimilates the "natural" moral wisd . m
around it in terms of its own truthfulness and in terms of its integrtty
with the Christian vision. The theologians who would contribut e to
the conversations about bioethics must fir st listen attentively a nd
respectfully to " natural" moral wisdom concerning medicine. T hen
they can spea-k responsively and responsibly about the adoption a.nd
selection of certain standards as coherent with reason, with med icme
construed as a practice , and with the Christian vision .
" The Oath In So Far As A Christian May Swear It" offers a seco nd
lesson for theologians interested in medical ethics. Note the t wo .
obvious changes. The first is that the practice and its standards were
set in the context of a Christian identity and of the Christian sto ry.
God the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, was invoked rather t han
Apoilo e t al. ; the physician cast himself on the mercy of His justice.
Once again, the invocation of God and His retribution served not on ly
to signal the solemnity of the oath and the stringency of the o bligations, but also to set the physician 's identity and practice in the context of a story which has its beginnings with God. This feature was
expressed visil?ly as well. " The Oath In So Far As A Christian May
Swear It" - or at least some copies of it - was written in the shape of
. . 's
a cross. 34 The one who swore such an oath adopted the phys1c1an
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identity as a follower of Christ, "Who took our infirmities and bore
our diseases " (Matt. 8:17; cf. Is. 53:4). A Christian identity nurtured,
sustained, and shaped the physician's identity for those who took such
an oath seriously .
The second obvious change is the reduction of duties to one 's
teacher. Historically, this change is understandable. Medical instruction had shifted from artisan families and guilds to universities and
eventually to faculties of medicine . 1'he Church itself was, for centuries, the nurturing and sustaining institution and community for
medicine. It chartered and administered the universities; it dominated
the curriculum; its pervasive ethos ruled the professions. 3 5 Morally,
the change was required by setting the oath in the context of the
Christian story, for that story makes service the mark of greatness as
well as of grat itude . So, it was inevitable that service to the patient
was emphasized rather than obligations to teachers. The Christian
story of breaking down the barriers that separate people, moreover,
made it inevitable that the emphasis shifted from professional elitism
to open access to this community of service.
What Is the Lesson Here?
The lesson here is not that we should attempt to reintroduce
"Christendom" or even the patterns of medical instruction of that
time. Notwithstanding the impossibility of such an attempt, the
dominion of the Church was marked by parochialism as well as
majesty, by pett.iness as well as grandeur, by obscurantism as well as
learning. The reformist intention does not lead back to Christendom
for either medicine or the Church . There is little hope for a Christian
medical ethic that proceeds by way of a theological triumphalism, that
claims to have truth, if not captive, at least cornered. The lesson is
rather that Christian medical ethics cannot proceed with integrity if it
always restricts itself to articulating and defending standards of the
practice or certain applications of impartial principles of philosophy
or law to medical dilemmas. It is lamentable that so little of the work
in medical ethics by Christian theologians candidly and explicitly
attends to the Christian story and its bearing on medicine . 36 It is
lamentable for the communities of faith out of which these ethicists
Work, for they want to live in faith, to live in integrity with the
identity they have been given and to which they are called . But it is
. also lamentable for the broader community, for a pluralistic society
Profits from the candid expression of different perspectives. Candid
attention to the theological dimensions of morality could prevent the
reduction and distortion of morality to a set of minimal expectations
necessary for pluralism and remind all participants in such a culture of
broader and more profound questions about what human persons are
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meant to be and to become. The integrity to think about and t1 k
about the relevance of the Christian story is the second lesson of "1 e
Oath In So Far As A Christian May Swear It."
The first lesson of " The Oath In So Far As A Christian May Sw• u
It" was that Christian ethics does not disown "natural" morality . 1 te
Christian story does not force those who own it to disown eitl er ·
medicine as . a practice or human rationality. The second lesson Jf
"The Oath In So Far As A Christian May Swear It" is that Christi; 1s
concerned with medical ethics should have the integrity to set m( licine in the context of the Christian story, to form, inform , and refo m
medicine. The first lesson stands against any premature sectar :1n
stance, against opting prematurely for either a sectarian communit~ or
a sectarian medicine.37 The second lesson stands against any sim Jle
identification of a Christian ethic either with universal and ratic tal
principles or with a professional ethic, against, for example, sanct ·yingcontract theory by identifying it with "covenant." 38 The task i! to
transform or, to put it less presumptuously, to qualify3 9 a ratic 1al
ethic and a professional ethic by candid attention to the Christ an
story.
There will be tensions, of course. With respect to decisions ab .ut
the refusal of treatment, for example, a universal and rational e1'1ic
may emphasize the patient's autonomy, but a professional ethic n ay
emphasize the physician's commitment to the life and· health of h i. or
her patient, and a theological ethic may emphasize disposit iJ ns
formed and informed by a story where the victory over death :s a
divine victory, not a technological victory, where people need not
stand in dread of death, but may not practice hospitality toward
it. 40 These tensions and their resolution will require the careful at t en·
tion of those who make it their task to think about medicine and w ho
care about the Christian story as the story of our life, our whole life.
Finally, it may be observed that theological reflection, even wh en it
is presumptuous enough to talk about . " transformation," does not
represent an alien imposition upon the practice of medicine . As we
have seen, the tradition of medicine as a practice is at home in p iety .
Loyalty to God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, fulfill s and ·
redeems natural piety. The native senses of gratitude and depend ence,
of a tragic fault in the midst of our world, and of responsibility , are
not disowned by a theol~gical approach, but informed and reformed
by the Christian story. The current literature on bioethics stands at
risk of ignoring that story, of neglecting those resources. Chris t ians
have a vocation to identify and articulate the significance of the Christian story for medicine not only because that agenda stands comfortably in an ancient tradition, but also because it will serve both
integrity within the Christian community and humanity with med ical
practice. To renege on this opportunity and vocation will diminish not
only the communities of faith, but the art of medicine as well.
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